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Direct and Indirect U.S. 
Government Debt 
Steven L. Schwarcz1
My presentation focuses on two issues. First, I comment on the draft 
paper by Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., “United States Sovereign 
Debt: A Thought Experiment on Default and Restructuring,” which 
explores the restructuring of U.S. Treasury Securities (“Treasuries”)—
the classic form of direct U.S. government debt. Second, I discuss an 
important type of indirect U.S. government debt—financing raised 
by the federal government through special-purpose entities (SPEs)—
and the possible consequences of such indirect financing. 
I. Comments On Professor Mooney’s Paper
A. Specific Comments.
 
Let me begin with specific comments, most critically what terms of 
the debt should be restructured. Prof. Mooney’s paper only mentions 
restructuring the principal amount of Treasuries, ignoring their in-
terest rate and maturities. Extending debt maturities, however, could 
help the government avoid default by readjusting debt repayment 
1 Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law, and 
Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center; schwarcz@law.duke.edu. 
These comments are copyright © 2012 by Steven L. Schwarcz. I thank Feroz Ali 
Khader for valuable research assistance. 
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to revenues. At the same time, it arguably would be more constitu-
tionally permitted than reducing the principal amount,2 especially if 
the extended maturities accrue interest at a market rate so that, eco-
nomically, there would be no “actual loss.”3 Extending debt maturi-
ties would also be less politically and commercially disruptive than 
reducing the principal amount, because the debt would eventually 
be honored.
Prof. Mooney may wish to compare the ability of large Treasuries 
holders to quickly exit the market with the increasing corporate 
debt-restructuring problem caused by distressed-debt trading. Not 
only are large investors able to quickly divest their claims, at a dis-
counted price. More significantly, buyers of those claims often in-
clude opportunistic investors, such as hedge funds, who increasingly 
have been trying to “game” the system for short-term advantage. This 
has been undermining some of the long-term debtor restructuring 
goals of the federal Bankruptcy Code.4  
Regarding post-default enforcement of Treasuries, Prof. Mooney’s 
paper observes that the offering circular for Treasuries provides, with 
respect to the commercial book-entry system, that the federal gov-
ernment does not “have any obligation to any person or entity that 
does not have an account with a Federal Reserve Bank.” But query 
whether that restriction might itself be unconstitutional because it 
“questions” enforceability of the debt.  Moreover, if that restriction 
were held to be unconstitutional, at least two additional questions 
would arise: Would investors be deemed to, and could they even, 
waive the unconstitutionality?
I am not convinced, as is Prof. Mooney, that default should be equat-
ed with invalidity. Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that the “validity of the public debt of the United States . . . 
shall not be questioned.”5 Prof. Mooney observes that the plurality 
2 Cf. infra note 5 and accompanying text.
3 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 358 (1935).
4 See Harvey Miller, Keynote Address: Bankruptcy And Reorganization, Through The 
Looking Glass Of 50 Years (1960 – 2010), presented March 12, 2012, at the annual 
Induction of Fellows of the American College of Bankruptcy, United States Su-
preme Court, at 12-13 (expressing concern over distressed-debt trading). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §4.
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in Perry held that Congress lacks the authority to “alter or destroy” 
the federal government’s obligations to repay borrowed funds. But 
to question the “validity” of public debt appears more closely tied 
to questioning the premise of the debt. One could distinguish that 
from changing when the debt is payable or paid, for example. When 
a debtor refuses to pay, it acknowledges the debt but does not pay. In 
contract law, a parallel to this would be the distinction between the 
legality of a contract and breach of a contract.
Finally, Prof. Mooney raises the possibility of the federal government 
selectively defaulting on debt held by some but not all foreign na-
tions. Query whether that might constitute unfair discrimination 
by the federal government in violation of the Most-Favored-Nation 
clause of the WTO agreement, resulting in trade sanctions under the 
WTO dispute settlement regime?6 
Next, I consider more general questions raised, or at least inspired, 
by Prof. Mooney’s paper.
B. More General Comments.
 
A critical question is the extent to which the federal government 
might be able to achieve a consensual restructuring of its Treasuries. 
The biggest obstacle to a debtor attempting to consensually restruc-
ture its debt is the holdout problem: that one or more creditors may 
strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-restructur-
ing plan, hoping they either will receive full payment of their claims 
or that the imperative of other creditors to settle will persuade those 
creditors to allocate to the holdouts more than their fair share of the 
settlement.7 
In order to help solve the holdout problem, sovereign nations often 
insert so-called collective action clauses (CACs) into their debt in-
struments. These clauses permit a super-majority vote by holders of 
6 It also should be noted that some recent bilateral Free Trade Agreements negoti-
ated by the U.S. government have included Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treat-
ment clauses with regard to sovereign debt issued by the parties. 
7 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 322, 328 (2011). 
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those instruments to change the key terms of the instruments.8 I have 
found no evidence, however, that Treasuries contain collective action 
clauses.9 The federal government might wish to consider the pros 
and cons of including these types of clauses in future issuances of 
Treasuries—a potential negative being that even acknowledging the 
possibility of the need to restructure its debt (by including CACs) 
might increase financing cost and panic the Treasuries market. 
Absent collective action clauses, the federal government can still 
solve the holdout problem at a later date, if and when needed. In 
a state-debt context, I have argued that a “minimalist” approach 
to government debt restructuring could be used to help solve this 
problem (possibly without significantly increasing the cost of debt) 
by legislatively imposing supermajority voting by classes of claims.10 
Logically, the federal government could legislate a similar solution to 
the holdout problem.
The federal government should be able, constitutionally, to enact 
such legislation. The Constitution’s Contracts Clause applies only to 
state, not federal, action. And, as explained below, I do not believe 
such legislation—even if retroactively applied to Treasuries or other 
forms of federal government debt—would constitute a “taking” un-
der the Fifth Amendment.
Certainly Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution to retroactively impair contractual obligations.11 I 
would not rely on that power, however, because it is questionable 
(as Professor Mooney acknowledges) whether the Bankruptcy Clause 
8 Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical 
Comparison, HARV. BUS. L. REV. 301 (Fall 2011 issue), also available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1872552.
9 Although one conference participant had vaguely recollected that federal law 
under which Treasuries are issued might reserve the federal government’s right to 
amend the terms of outstanding Treasuries, neither that participant nor I could find 
the source of that right. Cf. 31 C.F.R. §356.33(c) (enabling the federal government 
to change the terms, pre-issuance, of new issues of Treasuries). Newly issued Trea-
suries could include provisions that enable the federal government to amend their 
terms, but that likely would greatly increase government financing costs.  
10 See A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” supra note 7.
11 Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
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would apply to federal government debt. But even without that pow-
er, the legislation’s retroactive application should not violate the Fifth 
Amendment because retroactive federal legislation is constitutional 
(and not a “taking”) so long as it does not completely destroy prop-
erty rights in a way that the affected parties could not have anticipat-
ed.12 The consensual relinquishment of rights under supermajority 
voting should not constitute complete destruction of creditor rights. 
The only right that is completely destroyed is an individual creditor’s 
right to be a holdout; that right, however, is arguably an unreason-
able private expectation that should not be protected.13 
My other general comment responds to questions raised in the con-
ference of how the federal government might accelerate revenues in 
order to pay maturing Treasuries. One such approach might be se-
curitization, in which the government securities—or monetizes—
future revenues. In a famous example, David Bowie securitized the 
revenues coming due under his future song royalties. The federal 
government might similarly consider securitizing future tax reve-
nues, for example.14 To the extent a federal-revenue securitization is 
structured under specific enabling legislation, the legislative certainty 
would reduce financing costs compared to corporate securitizations, 
which rely on an imperfect patchwork of case-law, statutes, scholarly 
articles, and soft law.15 
Next consider an important type of indirect U.S. government debt—
financing raised by the federal government through special-purpose 
entities.
12 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528–29 (1998) (“[L]egislation might be 
unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties 
that could not have anticipated the liability . . . .”); United States v. Riverside Bay 
Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985); Speckmann v. Paddock Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
13 See Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L. 81, 100 (1997).
14 By way of analogy, my experience is that some municipalities, over the past de-
cade, have been securitizing their tax revenues. 
15 See generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A 
GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002 
& supplements).
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II. Federal Government Financing Through SPEs
A. Introduction.
Restructuring Treasuries would be only part of the U.S. govern-
ment debt-restructuring picture. I have been examining the growth 
of federal government financing through the use of special-purpose 
entities (“national SPEs”).16 It is possible this growth not only will 
continue but accelerate. By way of analogy, most U.S. state debt is 
no longer in the form of general obligation bonds but debt issued by 
state-sponsored SPEs.17 
Consider the following examples of national SPEs. 
B. Taxonomy.
1. Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).
 
The most prominent national SPEs are the so-called government 
sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (used 
for promoting home ownership).
2. SPEs Used in the 2008 Financial Crisis.
 
In order to stabilize and bring liquidity back to the commercial paper 
markets during the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve 
created, among other facilities, the Commercial Paper Funding Fa-
cility (“CPFF”) to operate as a lender of last resort for those markets. 
Because the Fed traditionally used its lender-of-last-resort powers 
16 Steven L. Schwarcz, “Special-Purpose Entities in National Finance” (draft on file 
with author).
17 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Pub-
lic Finance, 97 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012, issue no. 2) (discussing SPEs 
used for state-government financing); Cheryl D. Block, Congress and the Accounting 
Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 435-42 (2003) 
(identifying the problem of national SPEs). Also compare Jonathan Rosenbloom, 
Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Authority Administration Lead to Democ-
racy, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851 (2005-2006) (raising normative questions about 
state SPEs).
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under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to only make loans to 
banks, it structured the CPFF as a series of Fed loans to State Street 
Bank and Trust Company, which then made back-to-back loans to 
a newly-created special-purpose entity, CPFF LLC. CPFF LLC used 
the back-to-back loan proceeds to purchase commercial paper from 
corporations and other commercial paper issuers.18 
 
Similarly, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) 
was designed to provide liquidity to U.S. money market investors 
during the financial crisis. Under the MMIFF, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York could provide senior secured funding to a series of 
special-purpose entities to facilitate an industry-supported private-
sector initiative to finance the purchase of eligible assets from eligible 
investors.19 
3. Other National SPEs.
I also have been examining the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
and other “authorities” and “public benefit corporations,” as well as 
SPEs used to finance military aircraft, including through leasing.
C. Identifying Possible National-SPE Abuses.
 
National-SPE financing can strike at the very heart of our system of 
representative government, placing into question the fiscal integrity 
of public governance. I have been analyzing, both descriptively and 
normatively, their monitoring, governance, and accountability and 
the transparency of their debt liabilities.20 Although the use of na-
tional SPEs is not inherently wrongful, SPEs have at least as great, if 
not greater, potential to be abused in public finance than in corpo-
rate finance. Several factors contribute to this. 
18 Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s Com-
mercial Paper Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON. POLICY REV. 423 (June 2010). 
See also FRB: OTHER LENDING FACILITIES - CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY 
PROGRAMS AND THE BALANCE SHEET, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_lendingother.htm (last visited Apr 24, 2012).
19 FRB: MONEY MARKET INVESTOR FUNDING FACILITY, http://www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm (last visited Apr 24, 2012).
20 I have not considered, however, national-SPE debt restructuring questions per se.
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Reduced transparency of national SPEs, like corporate SPEs, can un-
dermine financial integrity. Because national-SPE debt is not techni-
cally a legal obligation of the federal government, the government 
does not have to disclose that debt in its financial statements and 
budget. This lack of disclosure can be misleading; the federal govern-
ment may have compelling economic and reputational motivations 
to stand behind that debt, especially if the national SPEs engage in 
providing critical government services—as occurred when the federal 
government recently backstopped Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s ob-
ligations—or if the federal government’s failure to backstop the debt 
might cause a downgrading of ratings on federal government debt. 
Because of these motivations, the federal government effectively is 
making undisclosed de facto guarantees.
Off-balance-sheet financing can also trigger systemic consequenc-
es.21 Its use by corporate SPEs is seen, for example, as a contributing 
cause of the 2008 financial crisis.22 The lack of transparency can also 
have other serious consequences, such as preventing debt from being 
priced correctly based on national fiscal risk. Moreover, unlike cor-
porate SPEs, reduced transparency of national SPEs can undermine 
constitutional and democratic legitimacy. 
 
21 Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (observing 
that Enron’s use of SPEs could have triggered a systemic financial crisis if Enron’s vi-
ability had more closely correlated with the viability of other financial institutions).
22 See, e.g., Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, The U.S. Housing Bubble 
and the Global Financial Crisis: Vulnerabilities of the Alternative Financial System 
(2008), available at http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_
id=b54b89ff-649e-4e45-93f0-395d1f507762; What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 22, 2008, at 79, available at http://www.economist.com/node/10881318; 
Niall Ferguson, Wall Street Lays Another Egg, Vanity Fair, Dec. 2008, at 190; Mark 
Jickling, CRS Report for Congress: Averting Financial Crisis (2008), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103688.pdf; Martin Neil Baily et al., The Or-
igins of the Financial Crisis (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_origins_cri-
sis_baily_litan
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D. Assessing the Propensity for Abuse.
 
The federal government may have a greater inherent propensity than 
corporations to want to use SPEs to raise off-balance-sheet and off-
budget debt: unlike corporations, the federal government cannot 
“fail” in the sense of being forced to liquidate, so it lacks that deter-
rent against non-transparent use of SPEs.  
National SPEs are also more likely to be misused than corporate SPEs 
because, as I explain in my forthcoming publication, public finance 
is more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring failures.23
E. Restraining National-SPE Abuses.
 
How should national-SPE abuses be restrained and, whatever the 
restraints, how should they be implemented? Regarding the first 
question, regulatory efforts to reform state and corporate SPEs sug-
gest four overarching organizing principles: improving transparency 
of the SPE debt; improving monitoring of the SPEs; limiting the 
SPE debt; and improving SPE governance.24 I elsewhere explain how 
these principles could, and arguably should, be applied to national 
SPEs.25
Regarding the second question (How should restraints be imple-
mented?), the clearest approach would be for the federal government 
to enact an oversight law for its own SPEs. But why would the fed-
eral government do that if the result is, effectively, to more clearly 
publicize its financial problems? 
23 See “Special-Purpose Entities in National Finance,” supra note 16. In that article, 
I explain that the federal government is monitored by citizens and creditors whereas 
corporations are monitored by shareholders and creditors. Creditors monitor only 
to the limited extent of their negotiated covenants but, unlike corporate debt, there 
are no covenants in federal debt. Therefore creditor monitoring of national-SPE 
debt is likely to be de minimis compared to creditor monitoring of corporate SPE 
debt. The federal government is also monitored by citizens, who have even less in-
centive to monitor than most creditors because, unlike creditors, few if any citizens 
are likely to have sufficient amounts at stake to justify the cost of monitoring. In 
contrast, corporations are also monitored by shareholders, who can have concen-
trated holdings.
24 The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 17.
25 “Special-Purpose Entities in National Finance,” supra note 16.
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One answer is that the federal government would be doing the “right 
thing.”26 Another answer, perhaps more pragmatic, is that as the 
problem of national-SPE debt becomes more publicly known, the 
federal government will face reputation costs. Improving national-
SPE accountability might then help the federal government save 
money.27 
26 Query whether the federal government, at least under the current Congress, 
really wants to do the right thing. One wag observed at the conference that politi-
cians might know what is right but they don’t seem to know how acting right can 
get them re-elected.
27 Cf. The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 17 
(observing a savings resulting from improving state-SPE accountability).
